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Critical Theory and Recovering Ethical Life are two very remarkable books.
These books are written for an academic audience whose interests lie in the present
status of theory and rationality whether in philosophy or the social sciences in general. The authors of both books have shown extreme sensitivity in their examination
of the way in which the debate has unfolded and also to the intricate details in the
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arguments of those involved in the debate. While neither book offers a complete
and satisfactory answer to questions about the status of reason in contemporary
theoretical discoures, they do elucidate quite well the problems with traditional

An Interview with Russell Berman
Department of German Studies, Stanford University

conceptions of reason and the way in which these conceptions have been responded
to. The authors have at least made more visible the many tensions involved in any
discussion of rational discourse, such as the problematic relationship between interpretation and validity claims, and have presented to us the more salient possibilities

Conducted by Jennifer Kopf, Credmon Staddon
disClosure Editorial Collective

for the continuation of rational discourses. Through my own reading of these texts I
have been forced to think about rationality from a variety of perspectives. Each
book represents an important moment in contemporary debates on rationality and

Lexington, Kentucky
Saturday, February 11, 1995

stands as an invitation to all who are interested in and are willing to participate in
the debate.
This interview with the German Studies and Cultural Theory scholar Russell
Berman took place in the context of his invited lecture to the Interdisciplinary
Committee on Social Theory's Spring Lecture Series at the University of Kentucky.
That lecture, entitled "Imperialism and Enlightenment," discussed the relations between philosophical models of enlightenment and the Western colonial project. The
interview picks up on this general theme, but brings it into such contemporary contexts as German unification and the economic collapse of the Soviet Bloc. Also
discussed are the epistemological and political statuses of Cultural Studies, which
Berman sees as deeply problematic. Throughout the discussion Berman is concerned also to raise the idea that cultural authenticity cannot be restricted to the old
centre I margin dichotomy, which he partially deconstructs. The interview concludes with some discussion of the points of convergence between German Critical
Theory and French Poststructuralism.

Culture, Nation, Identity and Contemporary Cultural Studies
disClosure: When you are talking about imperialism and enlightenment in your
book Cultural Studies of Modern Germany: History, Representation and Nationhood, you often refer back to the connections between "culture," "nation" and
"identity"; for example, when you are talking about the Gulf War, you refer back to
"culture-nation-identity" as a kind of explanatory triad. We thought that the dis-
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cussion of this foundational principle could provide the basis for this interview. To
quote from the introductory chapter of your book
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very special status of knowledge. So all of that is by way of a challenge to Cultural
Studies to think through whether it is happy whining that it is interdisciplinary or if
it might not try instead to overcome the misery of interdisciplinarity, and define a

"not because of any essential identification of culture and nation but
becau.se for cultural studies the nation is one particularly intriguin~ site
at which symbolic orders are distinguished."
Contrarily, others have argued that the notion of "culture", deriving from the

scientific agenda. Can one imagine a science of Cultural Studies?
Now Cultural Studies, as I observe it, is interested in examining the constitution
of collective identities through symbolic orders. That constitution including mo-

man nationhood, with German modernity. So, I would like to challenge you a bit

ments of resistance and the collective identification is crucial but not surprising;
remember that identities are always contested, that there are always different voices

on the status of this relation. Connected to this, I would also like to discuss with

within a culture...

German "Kultur," is absolutely identified with immanent nineteenth century Ger-

you the question of the rise and epistemological status of contemporary Cultural
Studies.

Now you've challenged me also on the loose connection between "culture and
"nation." I think that the "Nation" and national identity are very neuralgic sites of

Berman: In my work and in that book in particular I am trying to comment on
both Germany and some German questions as well as to raise constantly some theoretical questions about Cultural Studies. I think that Cultural Studies in its empirical and theoretical formulations in contemporary American universities has great
potential. I also think however that there is considerable confusion, both among the
advocates of Cultural Studies and its opponents, as to what Cultural Studies is. The
suggestion that one hears repeated ad nauseum in the defense of Cultural Studies is
that it is inter-disciplinary, or meta-disciplinary, or that it draws on various traditions. The only way one can respond to that is to say "well I am glad to hear that it
is not closed-minded, that it is prepared to draw on different traditions." Frankly I
think that many scholars are not closed-minded and are prepared to draw on different traditions, even if they are not part of Cultural Studies. Therefore there is a kind
of a straw man being set up in the insistent claim by the advocates of Cultural Studies that IT is interdisciplinary and open, and by implication that everybody else is
closed, befogged, antiquarian. Which is not to say that there are not some closed,
befogged, antiquarian academics in universities.
But the point of this whole prelude is to suggest that I think that the study of
culture needs to reflect on its disciplinary nature and on its scholarly
(wissenschaft/iche) foundations. I guess the question would be: if Cultural Studies
is just a collection of contingent practices, what justification does it have as scholarship; is it in any way different epistemologically from the material that it purports to
study? Or is academics just another culture, a set of discursive practices, making
reference to another culture: Germany, American popular culture, China? But then
there is really no justification for Cultural Studies claiming a location in that special
institution, the University, in which statements ought to be generated that have the
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culture for various reasons, and I am not quite sure that I can attempt to enumerate
them. But that is surely not the only way to imagine culture. One can certainly talk
about sub-cultures, which are cultures, but they refer to fields smaller than the nation. These might be regional cultures: there is a Southern identity, there is also a
New England identity. Or one might talk about culture in terms of ethnic groupings; there may an African American culture, or there may be several, just as there
may be an Italian-American culture. It might be the case that one can talk about
other groups that are smaller than nations, or that transcend nations, (e.g. diasporic
forms) which Cultural Studies could examine. In my book I am concerned with
Germany and a key feature of Germany is the construction of nation.
It could be, however (and this would be a third way of thinking about culture
after "nation," and "other groupings" which are generally imaginable as smaller than
the nation) that there is another way to think about culture, and that is culture as
universal. Are there universal characteristics of culture that Cultural Studies might

consider examining? Now this of course is a scandalous suggestion in the contemporary intellectual atmosphere, but I mean it very seriously. Because to the extent
that one surrenders the possibility of making any kind of universalist inquiry a certain political debilitation ensues. But that is not the truly intellectual argument It
might be the case that if one gives up the possibility of making universalist claims,
then the scientific status of Cultural Studies becomes untenable. For then it becomes just a matter of "this is true for me, but it is not true for you" in which case it
is not scholarship because it cannot be falsified. What would a universalist conception of culture mean? Fifty years ago it probably would have been secularized Protestantism imagined as the global set of values for individuals, faiths and character...
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I would think that Cultural Studies as an emerging discipline makes the initial
assumption that humans engaged in communities construct values and identities
through symbolic representations and that this is an existential feature of humans.
While it is probably the case that there are no values, particularly positive values,

therefore in some sense structurally equivalent to progressive discourses about the

that one can prove have universal necessity and there may be none that one can

"Indian subaltern" or other marginalised groups.

disClosure: That prompts me to wonder if you would agree with the proposition that current right wing discourses in US politics, about the "culture of poverty''
and the kinds of politics (to my mind regressive) implied by that perspective, are

detennine as having empirical universality, clearly Cultural Studies is making the
claim-the very exciting claim-that humans form their symbolic worlds and that
this is a feature of humanity in general. Now if one follows Cultural Studies down

Berman: I suggested a moment ago a project for Cultural Studies and its possible "growing up." There are, however, clearly limits to Cultural Studies or possible

this route - that humans make their symbolic worlds - then there may be some
definite claims that follow on that about the relations between individuals and

pitfalls around Cultural Studies. I think Cultural Studies, to the extent that one of
its moves is to go beyond literature and look at all sorts of objects and see them as

community, about past and present, that are the parameters within which any particular kind of culture gets played out.

parts of discourses and paradigms and orders of meaning in which we participate

disClosure: Well, what about that aspect of Cultural Studies that seems to be

gone wild" because here humans are always creative of meaning and always living

just as strong as the focus on the intersubjective construction of symbolic worlds?

in structures of meaning. Cultural Studies ends up being incapable of articulating
the encounter with the absolutely alienated, the absurd, brute force, which is surely
not only a semiotic event. AND this culturalism of Cultural Studies, comparable to

This is the political aspect, the sense that, yes Cultural Studies is all the things that
you say it is, but it is also foundationally counter-hegemonic. That what Spivak and
others are very much concerned with is, as she puts it, figuring ways in which the

and which they inherit and try to transform, participates in what I call a "semiotic
optimism" that everything has meaning. Pace Spivak, that is a kind of "humanism

"subaltern" can speak and speak specifically against hegemonic ways of defining
who ''they" are, and for that matter who "we" are. I think that only at one point,

the economism of orthodox Marxism, flattens out our world, making it just a place
where humans have meaning. Lord, growing up in the twentieth century, it is not
only meaning you encounter...

when you mentioned resistances as a component of collective identity formation,
did you begin to point towards that important defining feature of Cultural Studies.

disClosure: .. .it's markets, it's brute force, it's the Mexican economic crisis ....

Berman: I guess I have a complex relationship to that kind of insistence on the
counter-hegemonic character of Cultural Studies. I think that the discussion around

Berman: ...and it's meaninglessness.

Cultural Studies is prematurely and naively politicized when its proponents present
it as left-identified and its opponents denounce it as left-identified. I would think

Another dimension that is arguably beyond Cultural Studies just like the moment of alien meaninglessness is the moment of absolute luminosity. Religion,

that one could certainly study culture, that is to say engage in Cultural Studies and
come up with conservative results. Those conservative results might well be in

religious experience which taken seriously (and one of the good sides of Cultural
Studies is the imperative to take the Other seriously) is to some extent genuinely
beyond culture; it is Divine intervention, it is not humanly created. One has to entertain that possibility as-at least-an intellectual option, and imagine the mystic
moment as non-cultural. Anthropologists often flatten religion out into a positivist

many circumstances as counter-hegemonic or even more counter-hegemonic than
some of the left results. But aside from that polemic, I would want to say that culture, which is the object of Cultural Studies, has the capacity to be itself counterhegemonic so I would want to think about the difference between culture (I hesitate
to say "authentic" culture) and hegemony. Of course I can think of many examples
where culture can be hegemonic and complicitous. But I think that the reflection on
the capacity of humans to construct their symbolic worlds is by definition counterhegemonic. As counter-hegemonic it could however just as well be conservative as
progressive: when progressives own the state, conservatives may be oppositional.
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collection of features and rituals, and that is surely part of it and accessible to Cultural Studies. But I think that the genuine numinousness might be beyond Cultural
Studies as is the absence of meaning altogether.
In contrast to the culturalism of Cultural Studies, with its semiotic optimism,
critical theory, the Frankfurt School, is heir to the genuine EnJightenment tradition
of absolute skepticism, calling every putative meaning into question, subjecting it
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all to an ideological criticism, and imagining every collective identity as manipulated and authoritarian. The only collective identities that the genuine Frankfurt
School allows is the totalitarian mob and the movie fans. Now Cultural Studies
would say, "Oh no that is all meaningful and we have to figure out what it is all
about" whereas Critical Theory would say "Hell, that's meaningful; that is manipulation and enforced stupidity by the culture industry.,'
Now to come back to "the culture of poverty": the danger of Cultural Studies
and its culturalism is to buy into a notion of a "culture of poverty": the poor are just
like any other possible collective group with its own culture and one lives this way
in the slums with these sorts of rites, meanings and symbols, and one lives this way
in the suburbs with these sorts of rites, symbols and meanings and Cultural Studies
can examine them both with anthropological equanimity and is ultimately incapable
of making a distinction because it is unwilling to address the level either of meaningless or brute force. Following this path Cultural Studies ultimately ends up in a
right Hegelian position of justifying the "culture of poverty" as just another culture
disClosure: One about which we have no basis for judgment.. ..
Berman: Sure, because we have denied the existence of universals and norms.
So this is why culturalism can become conformism, since with the assumption that
everything is meaningful it will inevitably end up claiming that the real is rational,
which is right wing Hegelianism.

Regionalisms, Human Rights and the Bases for Moral Judgement
disClosure: Your position on conflict between regionalisms and universalisms
leads me to ask if regionalism is always conservative. In a recent talk you gave at
the University of Kentucky I got the sense that the regionalists, the people who want
to pay attention to localities, somehow always end up politically conservative. You
asked "Can normative democracy have a specific character?" And also "How can
we talk about human rights in China?" So I'm trying to think through the relations
between the region and conservatism.
Berman: The way you talk about human rights in China is by insisting that being human entails some inalienable rights, which is akin to the Enlightenment declaration of independence in thought. I remember during the Vietnam era, in response
to some of the self immolations of Buddhist monks protesting American intervention, General Westmoreland said that the American public should not be concerned
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about this because Asians have a different relationship to death. Now that is cultural relativism writ large, and I think that Cultural Studies has to figure out a way
to distinguish itself epistemologically from General Westmoreland. Clearly Cultural
Studies is at pains to distinguish itself politically and empirically, wrapping itself in
the red flag as it were, saying "Oh we have nothing to do with Westmoreland." But
in fact this is the same epistemological terrain; it has no grounds to talk about human rights in China, because the only way to do so is to try to imagine some kind of
universalist capacity. Now that universalist capacity does not have to be as positive
as "Everyone has access to salvation through Christ," but must be open to an emphatic critique of the question "what is human"? If one denounces that discourse as
an expression of "western imperialism" then there are no grounds for that criticism.
But of course if there are no grounds for the critique of human rights in China, then
there are probably no grounds for critique of Apartheid in South Africa, also another
culture. And if there is no grounds for critique of Apartheid in South Africa, then
are probably no grounds for Americans to talk about British police actions in Northern Ireland. And if there are no grounds for Americans to talk of British police
actions in Northern Ireland, there are probably no grounds for... ad infinitum.
Every critique becomes a matter of outside intervention which is denounced from
the standpoint of Cultural Studies' "semiotic optimism."
disClosure: So on what can we ground universalist claims, or claims to some
value?
Berman: Well, I suggested one before: the capacity for culture itself. That
does not necessarily lead to any particular conclusion. It is probably somewhat
more conservative than the UN Declaration on Human Rights which has a sort of
Jacobin clarity to it. But the human capacity to create meaningful worlds could be
read in both an individual sense, drawing on the young Marx's belief that every
human can be free, creative and active, and therefore structures that deny this freedom might be subject to sanction. Or it could be read in a communitarian way, for
culture is also a shared collective undertaking. That is why I say Cultural Studies
would not necessarily lead to a particular judgment in individual cases. But that is
not necessarily bad because in all judgments there is always a big pragmatic dimension and we might as well concede it. That is the answer to the remark regarding
universalism.
Frankly right now I find more interesting the question about regionalism and
conservatism. Much of the history of the past two or three hundred years has involved the creation of larger and larger political and economic structures. There are
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probably counter examples, but it is also probably indisputable· that it is itself inti-

the inside might affect something positively. I would like you to talk some more

mately related to the Enlightenment. So at least in this period there is a directional-

about the relations between "insides" and "outsides."

ity to human activities. Regionally, in addition to this bigger sphere there is also
heightened mobility. Therefore a regional identification necessarily tends to be

Berman: I think that you put it quite well. The received opinion is that the

conservative as measured against the general trend of modernization. Again there

margin, minority, the fragment-it is all a sort of romantic trope-is the interesting

can be counter examples.

site as opposed to the hegemonic, stable, reified, ossified, morbid center. I wonder

disClosure: I was just trying to think it through in the context of German unification. Many people argue that the constitutional clause which was applied to East
Germany unification had originally been written for the Alsace, and that each of the
five states of the former GDR should have had its own referendum and autonomously requested (or refused) annexation to the larger union. So I am thinking too

if that binary is not just a vestige of 18th century sentimentalism, and that in fact
culture works much differently. In particular there is always an interaction between
center and margin, between subversion and order, and that the possibility of culture,
or of successful culture, might depend on a capacity for traditionalism. By traditionalism I mean a constant reference to the past in a non-reified way, that is to say a
past which includes its reevaluation and restructuring.

of the possibility that a state, say perhaps Thilringen, might have said that it did
indeed want to join the West, but that would have been quite a different sort of
process.

Traditionalism is denounced in a caricatured form as holding on desperately to a
long dead canon, or pre-modem values. But maybe traditionalism transforms the
past in passing it on. Maybe one way I can highlight the claim I am making is to

Berman: The question I would have asked would be whether regional identification, which can be both an expression of current local interest including com-

suggest that in many of the theoretical statements around Cultural Studies, the insistence on the non-essentialism of identity is made and instead identity is cast as rela-

munity control and direct democracy, as well as possibly including a stronger tem-

tionship. What is meant is that the differences among various simultaneous actors is

poral dimension, will tend to be "the expression of those who have not yet moved

the frame of the terrain in which symbolic orders are played out, rather than, per-

away." This may, perhaps, be the source of greater counter-hegemonic potential
than one would expect, which is to say that in this case maybe conservatism is more

haps, each actor having a clear and legible identity in isolation from what used to be
called a "soul."

counter- hegemonic than progressivism.
disClosure: I can certainly see that in the German case.

Now, my critique of that is not to try to resurrect the soul, perish the thought,
but to suggest that the model of relationality, derived as it is from certain structuralist accounts, suffers from the presentism of structuralism, what is often called the

Berman: We can talk about Germany of course, but I still want to challenge

"anthropological present," and tends to obscure temporal connections. Identity is

Cultural Studies; I think that conservatism is probably the genuine alterity to Cul-

spatialized, and temporality comes up short. Within relationality then, I would want

tural Studies and the one alterity that it is afraid to touch.

to include a temporal relationality as well, which includes therefore an involvement

disClosure: An alterity that Cultural Studies is likely to represent as no alterior,
but as the hegemonic center. I am interested in your critique of the Cultural Studies
attack on the dominant actor by going out to the rest of the world and setting up the
idea that perhaps it is the outside that is actually active, through the complex play of
power, domination and hegemony, while the inside is inactive, hegemonic, and

both with the past and with the future, and in fact, which recognizes that a capacity
to engage with the future depends on a vital relationship with the past, hence traditionalism. The enforced amnesia of contemporary society, in which both Disneyland and Cultural Studies presentism participate, effectively rob commumties of
relations to their past, and therefore prohibits them from having any capacity to act
teleologically toward an improved future.

boring. You suggest that the inside also acts and there is a genuine interaction.
When I read this claim in the introduction to Cultural Studies of Modern Germany,
my first reaction was "Oh you can't say that, that is conservative." You are saying

disClosure: I'd like to consider "amnesia" as you have just described it a bit
more. A notion of "unification as forgetting" was set up in discussion around your
lecture when you suggested that "we have to have amnesia in order to get out of this
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business." In the c~ent-day Gennan context I think of Rambout and Gauck, who

resentment in the fonner Confederacy against the universalist arrogance of the Un-

oversee dissemination of infonnation from the files of the East Gennan Secret po-

ion after 1865. Hence the image I use of "carpet-bagging Wessies."

lice. I see at least three possiblities for these files. Many people say "let's just keep
those files hidden". But there's also Benjamin's critique of Saint-Simonianism: we
should not rebuild cities, because we need them there as a reminder of what's hap-

disClosure: Which gets back to question of how do we balance those two?
There's no easy fonnula.

pened. That would suggest that the files should be preserved as a sobering monument or warning. The third alternative is the dead weight of history, what Benjamin
calls historicism, which I think in the unification context would probably be the
PDS (the old "Communist" party in East Gennany). I wonder if you could talk
about how to operationalize Benjamin's analysis of materialist pedagogy when we
think about unification in the 90s in Gennany.
Berman: We were moving beyond the presentism of one-dimensional culture
studies and we're beginning to recognize the importance of a relationship to the
past, a productive and vital relationship to the past. Then we noticed Nietzsche with
his distinction among various uses and abuses of history. Not any relation to the
past is a good relation to the past, and there are some unfortunate relations to the
past that are not merely forgetting, antiquarianism, a dead weight of the past, but

Berman: Right, there's no easy fonnula. I don't know. It may be that there is a
way to theorize this, but it also may be a matter of examining particular cases. What
would be the two possible options? One of them would be to say ''the universal
nonns are valid and applied, but one should be extremely reluctant in imposing their
application". There's a differenc~a big differenc~between critiquing the
"ethnic cleansing" and intervening to stop the "ethnic cleansing." There's a difference between judgment and action. Or the other way to balance it is to understand
that local memories are always going to become complex and diverse and that
there's an obligation to side with the particular local memory closest to the universalist aspirations. That second model would be the justification for the North's
invasion of the South in the US Civil War, ifthe North had invaded the South to put
an end to slavery. But of course that's a dubious claim.

that can debilitate. These may well be constitutive in any identity fonnation as the
character to resist the forces of reunification.
Western Cultural Hegemony and the Collapse of the Former Soviet Bloc
Now, the argument that I make with regard to Gennan unification is that the 40
years of experience in the GDR are now being subsumed into a triumphalist history
of West Gennany. And without in any way suggesting that the East Gennans' Socialism was a successful undertaking, I do note that there are 17 million people there
who went through an awful lot, and are faced with a set of current discourses which
imply an across-the-board devaluation of their biographies. They're being told that
40 years of their lives don't count, that they were worthless and any defender of the
worth of that experience (not the worth of the regime, but the worth of the experience) runs the risk of being subjected to police-state like leaks from the hidden
documents. So the Stasi documents, evidence of massive collaboration, this dead
weight of the past is held over the East Gennan population to assure its docility in
the process of unification. The result will be alienation and resentment.
The extraordinary success of the PDS is due not to Communist nostalgia, although that's some component of it, or to any of the other excuses that are mounted
for it. This is an expression of resentment against the universalist arrogance of West
German political culture. In many ways, therefore, this situation is comparable to
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disClosure: I would like to explore a point that I think in some ways speaks to
the Western response to the collapse of the so-called Eastern bloc and relate it to
some of the points we discussed a moment ago about Cultural Studies. There are
those, among them Mary Louise Pratt and Stephan Greenblatt, who suggest that the
Enlightenment experience of new lands and new peoples is not just a matter of trying to cram these people and places into a flat topos, the taxonomy of Linnaeus, but
also, at every moment, is a reflexive reconstitution of the Western self. I think
Greenblatt makes this most clear in his book Marvelous Possessions. What that
seems to imply is a kind of anxiety that's inherent in Western Enlightenment, and
one almost gets the sense that this was the primary drive behind the Western response to the collapse of Eastern Bloc: the colonization of Eastern European identities as "other", as pure lack/absense in comparison with presence of the triumphant
West. That impulse seems to drive a complete devalorization of Eastern Bloc experience, as you've specifically mentioned vis a vis the fonner GDR
Berman: I see those two movements at the beginning and at the end of the
West, as so very different. In the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th centuri~ the West was
attempting to draw the non-European lands into this sphere. After 1989, the West
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was extremely confused by the collapse of the Soviet Empire, even today, has by no

imperialism means that foreign aid is just the post World War II version of colonial-

means come up with the anything like a coherent foreign policy. On the one hand,
the applause for Gorbachev and his dismantling of Communism, seen as the ultimate victory of capitalism, and the end of the Cold War; on the other hand, let us

ism. So then what is the Congressional Black Caucus up to when it wants to pre-

just review the glorious histories of the presidents of the "land of the free," from
President Bush, in his Kiev speech, arguing against Ukrainian independence, his
appalling apologies for the Gorbachev massacres, to president Clinton's memorable
remark that the bombing of Grozny, Chechnya was an internal Russian affair, presumably in the same sense as the massacre in Waco was an internal American affair.
Now, in these cases, there is an effort not to include Russia and its realm, but to
exclude it.

serve foreign aid?

disClosure: With respect to the former Yugoslavia I can see clearly how we end
up in this situation of "involved noninvolvement" as a result of these rather mixed,
crossed motives. On the one hand we want to gauge our force, on the other hand we
want to assuage our political consciences by emplacing an embargo, which in fact is
a form of involvement.

The same ambiguity applies in the Balkan War, which leads to this extraordinary debilitation, and the same Faustian dividedness in soul, that is characteristic of

Berman: I don't think that the embargo's going to assuage anybody's conscience. The act of the embargo is like the ban on selling arms to the Spanish Republicans in the Spanish Civil War; a minimal step in the right direction would be
lifting the embargo.

the born-again Republicans with regard to foreign policy. For, if you think they're
confused on domestic policy, I challenge you to tell me what their foreign policy

I think that, looked at in any kind of sober way, the only way to preserve Yugo-

would be. It can range from giving in to their long-standing anti-Russian hostilities
and therefore deciding to bomb the Serbs, or giving in to their long-standing isolationist sympathies, and telling the Bosnians to "go to Hell". And it's also a choice
between the globalism of Dole and Bush or the isolationism of Buchanan. So I
don't think there's a clear response on the part of the West.
I've just spoken about the United States and Americans, but you're absolutely
right that, as different as this is from the colonial model, the same kinds of fundamental issues are at stake. The specificity of the West and the assertion of the universal validity of these structures are at stake. If we looked at the colonial period
more closely we would find similar splits. I know that in the history of German
colonialism there was a lot of conservative opposition to colonialism, as I'm sure
there was in England or France. Colonialism was a very weird undertaking, and it

slavia would have been if the West had been prepared to introduce a massive influx
of arms to keep it together. It's very difficult to find a compelling moral argument
against Croatians living in independence, just as I think, by the way, that it's very
difficult to find a compelling moral argument against Chechnian independence,
except for the absolute priority of the right of Moskovites to cheap oil. If historically constituted peoples want to achieve a kind of national sovereignty, on what
grounds do outsiders have a right to embargo against it? One could certainly force
them back, but let's not pretend that this is a right.

disClosure: What you've just articulated, I think, speaks back to your earlier
comment about cultural universalism based on, as I understood what you were saying, essentially an empathizing with other individuals, other peoples' desires to be
distinct, and to articulate themselves with different spaces and times.

by no means represented what the whole nation or even the whole ruling class, if I
may, wanted to do. That's another reason why a certain kind of post-colonial theory
is amiss if it sees colonialism as the sole necessary outcome of Western Eurocentricity, because there were surely many opponents of Western culture: including
Germans, French, British, and Russians who didn't want to get involved in colonizing, for both progressive and conservative reasons.

In many of these cases it's precisely the progressive elements who are for colonialism because colonialism is seen as a modernizing impulse. Colonialism is just
the prehistory of foreign aid. The old new left critique that foreign aid is part of
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Berman: What would happen if one of these peoples declared itself to be distinct, and decided to persecute an internal minority? At what point do other states,
should other states, imagine intervening? In other words, put it to a test. It's a very
interesting question, but let's not pretend that we've gotten very far on it. The only
case where intervention has international legitimacy in order to protect minorities
was the United Nations decision to limit Iraqi sovereignty with regard to its persecution of the Kurds and the Shiites. Because of the potential ramifications for national sovereignty globally surely the United Nations is not going to do that to any
of the members of the Security Council.
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disClosure: And on that note, you sound very much like that part of Hork-

Studies is that in both cases the issue of national identity is sure to continue to con-

heimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment which castigates not Enlightenment as such, but as I think they put it, Enlightenment which has relinquished the
possibilities for its own realization.

cern thinkers in those two countries in coming years both because of the extent of

Berman: Enlightenment thought should engage the possibility for its own un-

disClosure: What does the Frankfurt School offer us on this that post-

realization through encounters with alterities in ways that do not segregate those
alterities and assume their absolute incompatibility.

refugee movements and labor mobility but also because of the challenges facing the
European Union.

structuralists don't or can't?

disClosure: And by extension refuse to recognize one's own, the alterity of the

Berman: I think what the Frankfurt School and poststructuralism have in common has to do with the fragility and diversity of identity structures. In a sense, I

"I" within that system, which I think is one of the components of, certainly

suppose, that betrays homologous intellectual historical lineages. The Frankfurt

Adorno's writings, and probably also Benjamin's, that Western scholars find most

School is a paratactic answer to the cohesive wholeness of Hegelian Marxism,
Georg Lukac and of orthodox Marxism in general. Now, poststructuralism is a de-

uncomfortable: their steadfast pushing of the implications theoretically and politically of the recognition of the alterior "I" itself. Perhaps that's the opposite moment
of that colonizing aspect of Enlightenment.

centered alternative to the reified structures that bored French students to tears in
the 1960s, so in a certain sense they're parallel, they're both moving toward more
complex formulations. In both cases there's a particular historical reason. And one
has to ask what can one get from each critique of reason, and what is incompatible

French Theory, German Theory, Cultural Theory
disClosure: We've been talking about the Frankfurt School and dominance, but
of course there's the poststructuralist argument for particularity. I want to build a
bridge across the Rhine of theory. What kind of affinities and distinctions do you
see between Poststructuralism and Critical Theory?

Berman: I think that, in the culture war within the left (as opposed to the culture war between the left and the right) a lot of trivial comments are made about
German theory/ French theory. Theory doesn't have a passport. "Theory doesn't
need a passport" is what I'd like to say, because, as theory, it raises claims to universal validity. Otherwise it's not theory. The distinction is more specious given
the clear indebtedness of the Structuralist and post-structuralist tradition to Heidegger and Freud, those noted Frenchme~ and the strong internalization on the part of
the German Enlightenment historically of Rousseau and other French thinkers. So

with that critique of reason. I think one might begin with the discussion that in
some poststructuralism, by no means all, there's a real emphatic theorization of
gender issues for example, not very noticeable in the Frankfurt School, although
that may be an expression of generational difference.

disClosure: Well, including surely, even a critique of the possibility of theory
itself, which is not often as manifest in poststructuralist thinking as, for example in
the late works of Adorno, Minima Mora/ia in particular, and I guess in all the works
of Benjamin. Which returns us, I think, to somewhere near where we began, in the
sense that we not theorize just the appropriate mode of theorizing about cultures,
which is very much one of the primary motivations of Cultural Studies as such, but
a critique of theorizing as such and its relation to culture and politics, in which I
think much more of the Adorno-Benjamin axis.

Berman: Yes, I think that's a good distinction between the two tendencies.

to think about this as German thought or as French thought is initially wrong. And
it's also subsequently wrong. Nevertheless, there will remain thinkers within Germany and thinkers within France-to the extent that thinkers remain at all.

Poststructuralism, for all its anti-logocentricity, pretty much ends up politically
correct and conformist, whereas Critical Theory is rarely politically correct and its

I .think the issue is, in both cases, that theory entails statements which lay claim
to umversal validity but which derive from particular experience. Then the question

and hegemonic moments within poststructuralism, I think to the extent that it has

becomes: What is the particular experience and especially, imagined sheer particular
experience in Germany and France. So I think the delightful surprise for Cultural
disClosure: REASON INCorporated

theory is much more naturally politically incorrect because of its much more emphatic doubts about the substance of progressivism. I think there are strong elitist
involved a multiplicity of language games and therefore gives up universality, it
strips away any possibility of an effective and consistent critique say, of the, dis-
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mantling of the redistributative mechanisms of the welfare state. But despite that
conformist banter, despite that moment in poststructuralism, it exists in the academy
in a strange hybridization with the progressivist sympathies of many of its proponents. That is, poststructuralists tend to be liberals despite the labile connection
between progressivism in politics and the theoretical resistance to any narrative of

POSTSCRIPT

progress. In contrast, the Frankfurt School raises grand doubts about the substance
of any particularly positive progressivism while at the same time, in the background,
there is an aspiration to ultimate emancipation. So it stands the poststructuralist
situation on its head.

Untitled Photograph by Paula Aguilera
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